would see the incompleteness of the biomedical model if only they would stop being so arrogant. So the foremost practical hurdle addressed by medical social scientists seems to be to chip away at the exclusive biomedical vision of doctors. the problem is that most physicians in clinical practice readily recognize the social nature of their profession. Working with patients so closely, they would have difficulty avoiding such. So social science seems to have been beating a dead horse by trying to "awaken" physicians to the sociological nature of their work. this much they already know. After all, medicine widely recognizes itself as both a science and an art (see Montgomery, 2006) .
What is less clear is just what to do regarding the social nature of medical practice. How should the physician utilize social science knowledge in the clinic? Here, the social sciences have offered a few suggestions, but, as I will argue, they have been of a similar, problematical kind. Moreover, we have even erected barriers to the inclusion of social science research. Knowledge about the aggregated tendencies of this or that group always is accompanied by warnings against reductionist interpretations where group-level tendencies are improperly projected onto individual people (tonelli, 2001) . In other words, we say to physicians, "Here is social science knowledge, but you cannot rightly apply it to your individual patients." Qualitative research, especially ethnography, produces more humanistic concepts because it does not require formal operationalization and so is arguably less objectified. However, when those findings are inevitably transposed to the clinic, qualitative insights nonetheless act as social facts that still are external to the patients themselves (assuming that those patients were not also participants in said research). Such concepts can then only have a probabilistic relationship to other individuals, even if, unlike quantitative research, the numerical probabilities remain uncalculated. the purpose of this paper is to suggest an alternative contribution that social science can make to medicine, one that provides for clinical medicine what it needs rather than social facts with ultimately limited utility. By elucidating the different epistemic approaches of artistic and scientific practices, I suggest how social science can better contribute to clinical practice by further developing and then passing along an artistic pedagogy for working with patients, one lurking in social science thinking and especially in ethnographic methods, but not schematized in a way that makes it usable for clinical practitioners. there is plenty of solid criticism about the problematic and limited ways in which doctors "learn to see" patients, but little explicit about how they might otherwise go about seeing (e.g., Foucault [1965 Foucault [ ] 1994 Waitzkin, 1985; Davenport, 2000) . to date, social science has predominantly adopted an old homeopathic assumption that "like cures like." It therefore has tended to offer its most abstracted scientific knowledge to medicine, and like homeopathy (especially in the United States), it mostly has been ignored in clinical practice. Where qualitative, ethnographic approaches have contributed to clinical medicine, they have ignored their most needed contribution, which centers on process, not product, on teaching clinical practitioners how to see the social, rather than on what professional ethnographers have seen in other times, places, and people.
In what follows, I address the epistemic underpinnings of medicine's identity crisis as both art and science. I then suggest that although social science is uniquely postured to contribute to clinical practice where art and science must collaborate, it has remained peripheral because of misunderstandings about where it fits epistemologically. Moreover, the way social science has approached medicine has accounted for neither logistic constraints of medical training nor methodological fallacies of utilizing "social facts" in clinical care. I attempt to address both by explicating a schema for the art of seeing the social and exemplifying its utility as a process by analyzing a real clinical encounter. this is important because, even where the calls to rehumanize clinical practice have been made, they have not been accompanied with any explicit pedagogy (see, e.g., tonelli, 2001; Montgomery, 2006) . By offering one such explicit pedagogy that emerges from epistemic clarity about the dual nature of clinical practice, I illustrate what social science can afford clinical practice if it recognizes its needed artistic role. Ultimately, this focuses on illuminating for the practitioner the process of seeing the social content of clinical interaction rather than on the necessarily didactic presentation of social facts that are remote from the practitioner's own actual encounters.
Although there is no shortage of calls to bring social science into medicine, the more fundamental processes of thinking by which art and science proceed have not been explicated to this end, so the artistic practices of medicine remain unspecified and untaught. Instead, the art of medical practice is conceptualized as an innate gift or one that springs de facto from experience, and little therefore is done to cultivate it. Yet doing so is more important than ever, since the complexities inherent in diagnosing and treating chronic illnesses suggest a re-expanding role for clinical judgment, because those conditions thoroughly intersect with the biography and beliefs of individual patients and now are the most significant contemporary mortality risks in developed countries (Wasserman and Hinote, 2011) . the profile of chronic illnesses significantly depends on lifestyles; these intersect with the biographical life course of patients to a much greater degree than acute ailments (cockerham, 2007) . Understanding the humanistic aspects of disease therefore becomes increasingly necessary, both locally, where subcultural affiliations predict lifestyle arrangements and in turn disease prevalence, and also globally, where deeper cultural dispositions can create disconnects between global health workers and local populations. Although some have called for increased specification of clinical protocols, often in the form of diagnostic checklists or other formalized management strategies, these can only take clinical practice so far (Gaffney et al., 2005; Gawande, 2009) . Instead, or at least in addition, the expanding complexity of clinical medicine in the era of chronic illness requires training practitioners to master more complex cognitive skills. Indeed, one might say that the epidemiological transition has promoted a type of clinical practice where the quality of care and bioethical decision making is increasingly grounded in the biography of individual patients. As such, clinical practice itself, and the bioethical judgments inherent to it, must be imbued with greater cognitive awareness of the individual human aspects of clinical care. this first requires an epistemology capable of insight into those things, and from there, the development of pedagogies for working with individual patients in ways responsive to their individual characteristics. In what follows, I present a schema that can serve as a starting point for doing this.
II. MEDIcINE'S IDENtItY cRISIS the history of Western medicine, "from humors to medical science" (Duffy, 1996) , often is interpreted as a linear ascent from the depths of religious superstition to the heights of scientific truth. certainly, the wholly empirical basis of medical research that preceded the dominance of experimental models can be construed as a more artistic practice, a humanistic process of seeing and interpreting. today, medicine is not so clearly dependent on the raw observation of bedside empiricism. Yet, those working with patients are keenly aware that in many areas clinical judgment still is an art, and for the purposes of this paper, the "art of medicine" will refer to the capacity for integrating the multiple dimensions (including psychosocial features) of the individual case narrative. Decisions about treatments require not only routine appeal to science, but understanding of the individual case, both physiologically (i.e., what the person's body requires) and psychosocially (i.e., what they value, believe, and expect; see Engel, 1977) . 1 the latter is especially important to patients when conditioned by uncertainties in the encounter (Lupton, 1996) . So the age-old question remains: Is medicine an art or a science? Montgomery writes: commencement speakers are fond of invoking the two in quick succession without much definition of either term. 'Medicine is a science', graduating physicians are reminded, 'but it is an art as well'. Or the duality is posed the other way around. 'Medicine is an art', the speaker will say, adding soon after, 'but above all, of course, it is a science'. these descriptions are not so much wrong as ill-defined and shallow. they are a reminder that medicine, site of modern miracles, is poorly defined and poorly described by those who nevertheless practice it quite well (Montgomery, 2006, 30) . the core of clinical practice is the case narrative, the individual human presentation that requires the physician's scientific and artistic skills to come into fruitful collaboration. this collaboration cannot be a one-sided application of universal medical science principles, nor can it be a mere staring at the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular person (tonelli, 2001; Montgomery, 2006) . When used singly, each approach violates the comprehensive demands of clinical practice. to reconcile these, physicians must resolve the implicit contradiction between an objective scientific demeanor prescribing universal remedies (i.e., scientific principles) and the individually engaged artistic focus on the particular person. clinical judgment fundamentally is about bringing the two together.
the disconnect between art and science in clinical practice lies in their contradictory epistemologies, used here to mean ways of making judgments and conclusions.
2 For the purposes of this paper, let us say broadly that science tends to work toward increasing specialization or differentiation, whereas art tends to work toward integration. Scientists differentiate the human into a body with component parts and biological processes that ontologically can be abstracted and viewed independently from particular selves. Artists use things and processes to be sure, but always in an effort to bring them together into a whole concept. A painter, for example, may use particular colors and techniques, though never for their inherent value, but rather as an expression of an underlying holistic idea, often an expression of self. Although comparing physicians to painters may appear to be a loose analogy at best, from an epistemological standpoint it is much more. Artistic practices in clinical judgment similarly may utilize pieces and processes of science, but like the painter, always from the integrative standpoint of the patient as a whole self.
From their respective epistemic foundations, art and science each entail a divergent clinical pedagogy, defined here as method of working with the patient. Were it not for the individual patient at the core of clinical practice forcing scientific and artistic sides to collaborate, it is possible that neither would have anything to do with the other. Instead, integrating the two is essential for the practice of clinical medicine.
III. PEDAGOGY OF tHE cLINIc
As medicine became increasingly scientific throughout the twentieth century, it increasingly sought to separate itself from its humanistic enterprises. this has been a necessary step for establishing the types of truth claims that underlie scientific authority. It was generally held that if medicine remained an intuitive or interpretive art, then its authority would be weakened (Starr, 1982; Duffy, 1996) . Because of this, the physician's artistic latitude has been increasingly relegated to those areas where science had not yet defined an accepted truth. today, where science has not said that one diagnosis or treatment is definitively better than another, the physician is permitted to be an artist, using the particulars of social context and patient attributes and values to guide care. But even then, the clinical discourse is framed by the given truths of the biomedical model. Real choices about a course of action are confined to a handful of recognized, but yet unprioritized, possibilities.
Medicine's move toward an increasingly scientific episteme has engendered critique from outside the medical profession, but also from within it. Witness the ongoing debate about evidence-based medicine, where extreme versions acquiesce to reductionism and diagnose individual patients based on population-derived likelihoods (e.g., Sackett et al., 1996; tonelli, 2001; Elstein, 2004; Rogers, 2004) . Although medicine certainly has come some distance from the "boys in white" era, this sort of scientism remains at the foundation of many clinical problems (see the classic by Becker et al., 1962) . Problematics in doctor-patient communication, for example, can be understood as stemming from the increasingly smaller role for patient individuation vis-à-vis biomedical symptomology. When out of balance in the clinic, the differentiated scientific direction of medicine, insofar as it is beyond the particular human, produces a didactic clinical pedagogy, a lecturing approach to patient care that has been often noted in the sociological literature (see, e.g., Waitzkin, 1985; clair, 1990; Lupton, 1996) . the retort of medical scientists is summed up by a sarcastic rhetorical refrain: "Do you want a skilled physician or someone to hold your hand?" Although it is an obviously false choice, the additional irony is that research has suggested significant numbers of patients actually would prefer the latter (at least given baseline competency: Lupton, 1996; Montgomery, 2006) .
At the outset of this paper, I claimed clinical practice commonly is regarded as a social activity, but at this point a key distinction is necessary. Although clinical practice has an undeniable social component, medical knowledge is routinely regarded as pure science, devoid of particular case narrative and sociocultural influences. Without explicating a robust artistic pedagogy by which physicians can work with patients rather than didactically on patients, social science in the clinic comes to mean adding social scientific knowledge, ontologically similar to that of medical science. Its purpose becomes reduced to assisting the doctor in being culturally sensitive, identifying the appropriate way to talk to a patient, given his or her group-level characteristics, with the goal of explaining and implementing a priori medical knowledge. certainly, doctors must recognize some type of human variability among their patients and tailor their language to it. But when guided by the primacy of universalized science, the clinic mainly is a didactic environment where the physician instructs the patient, often in ways that infantilize the one and empower the other (Lyman, 1988 (Lyman, , 1993 . Indeed, this is the dynamic intrinsically conveyed by the concepts of diagnosing and prescribing. Patients communicate to physicians only insofar as the doctor needs somatic information, ideally with minimal social context, which is taken to be peripheral to physical presentations. Where social science or even basic social skills are used in the clinic, they often are employed as lubricant for enacting cures on a body, and much less often as a necessary methodological component of the individual diagnostic and treatment process itself. 3 there is a palpable outcome of the didactic pedagogy in the clinic. In traditional didactic education, students succeed if they are able to mimic the teacher's vision and fail if they cannot. Similarly, in medicine, patients who do not find their way into the presuppositions of the physician also are deemed failures. these are the difficult, noncompliant, "ignorant," "uneducated," distrustful patients that physicians encounter every day. From another perspective, however, we also might say such patients are culturally or even ontologically disenfranchised from a scientific clinical practice lacking a developed artistic capacity that otherwise would be capable of identifying and working with these patients as legitimate, autonomous human selves. Because this problematic between physicians and patients results fundamentally from the art-science disconnect within clinical medicine, it is something that social science is ideally suited to address, although it must approach its task differently from what it has tended to in the past. In the next section, I explore why social science has not had more impact on clinical practice.
IV. SOcIAL ScIENcE'S OWN ScIENtISM
Social science is a broad designation for a variety of disciplines, which certainly have significant differences from each other. But although there is no univocal concept that can adequately capture the variety of the many fields considered to be social science, there is an epistemic affinity, though not total, between them. For our purposes here, it is the epistemological underpinnings, which thread through the admitted diversity of the social sciences, that form the basis of this argument.
Social science has failed to penetrate clinical practice in any significant and consistent way, as evidenced by the underwhelming utilization of social scientific knowledge in actual medical practice and its scant inclusion in medical curricula. Where it is included, courses in culture and medicine are situated to be peripheral and largely concern "bedside manner" rather than the impact of social scientific knowledge on the central practices of diagnosing and treating patients. Although social scientists are fond of complaining about being ignored, in this section, I argue that it is our own fault for failing to provide to medical practice the aspects of social science that it most needs. the limited impact of social science on medical practice stems from its acceptance and utilization of the very scientism that it critiques in medicine. the most obvious instance of this is in the prevalence of quantification. I argue that the qualitative, ethnographic work also tends to offer knowledge that is ontologically similar to aggregate statistical research, with a similar conceptual distance from the individual patient standing before the individual practitioner, and is thus problematic in the same way. Although research interjecting social science into scientific medical research encourages, rightly, a common language rooted in the requisites of scientific standards, the translation of this kind of knowledge to the clinic has been problematic. Instead of drawing on heavily aggregated findings and the reductionist warnings that attend, or at least should attend, their clinical use, social science needs to help frame a clinical pedagogy in a different way, that is, as a process of generating insight rather than applying a priori, aggregate knowledge. Research knowledge can sensitize practitioners, but never directly inform about a given patient. For the latter, a different though complementary practice is needed. In short, aggregation mostly works well for research, but it can become highly problematic for clinical practice.
Social science, particularly in more recent decades, has given strong preference to a differentiating epistemology that mimics the natural sciences, often by deciphering aggregate tendencies of this or that group. When skewed in this way, social science remains nothing more than a set of additional universal principles often regarded by physicians as peripheral to those of the natural sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry, etc.). A content analysis previously published by the author and colleagues illustrated that the two top-ranked journals in medical sociology have a preponderance of work employing quantitative methods (clair et al., 2007) . Although its disciplinary home in sociology makes this rather unsurprising for the Journal of Health and Social Behavior, it is also the case for Social Science and Medicine, a journal with a decidedly interdisciplinary focus that notably includes anthropology. Both journals also have a relative dearth of focus on medical practice, as illustrated by the percentages of substantive topic covered and lack of practical recommendations (liberally coded by the authors to include even a single sentence suggesting some practice-oriented course of action).
Large-scale aggregate data are appropriately applied to community-level interventions of the sort often designed in public health, but they are problematic for clinical practice, which concerns treating individual patients rather than promoting statistical increases in health outcomes of aggregated groups of people. Some of the top medical schools in the United States have attempted to incorporate social science components into their curricula, yet they have contributed to this misunderstanding by favoring the differentiating side of social science. Although this is good training for those interested in more macro-level public health interventions, such a practice fails to exploit another critical role of social science in clinical medicine-its capacity to provide a robust artistic pedagogy for working with individual patients (something that will be demonstrated in the next section).
Qualitative and ethnographic research skirts certain dimensions of this problem by avoiding the quantification and large-scale aggregation that produces results that can only be applied to individual patients through invalid reductionism. But interpretive methods such as these have not yet resolved the central problem identified here for a number of reasons. First, although qualitative and ethnographic work seeks to produce more robust and multidimensional concepts relative to quantitative practices, qualitative researchers nevertheless frequently employ a linear metaphor in their interpretations of data (Wasserman, clair, and Wilson, 2009) .
Second, much ethnographic and qualitative work is aimed at deconstruction of dominant paradigms and thus is useful for sensitizing physicians to possible sociocultural problematics of patient interactions. But this also has meant that such work has been more instructive about what not to do to offend the sociocultural sensibilities of patients than it has for making proactive contributions that enable physicians to connect with their patients' way of seeing. thus, in the end, such cultural work has been mostly about making patients feel better and more accompanied in the interaction, rather than posturing the social science of the clinic as critical to the fundamental diagnostic and treatment work done there. the former is a worthy pursuit for sure, but the latter is critically needed as well.
third, the analytic practices of qualitative and ethnographic methods are not well explicated. Often they are just postured as an empirical reporting of what one sees in the field and, secondarily, as what one sees in the data (Wasserman, clair, and Wilson, 2009 ). Even books on qualitative methods mostly deal with general epistemological questions, centering on critiques of positivism, and then skip to specific practices of coding and conceptualizing data, without explicating any general ontological schemas for organizing and interpreting the data, or even suggesting a need for researchers to develop them (see Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Lofland et al., 2006 ; grounded theory makes incremental improvements in this regard, see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; clarke, 2005; charmaz, 2006 ; more developed exceptions can be found in Glaser's [1978] coding families and Wasserman, clair, and Wilson' [2009] fractal concept analysis). In the end, what this implies is that seeing the social is subjective and ultimately dependent on the talent of the researcher. In the next section, I respond directly to this shortcoming by presenting a schema designed to avoid naïve positivism of the sort rightly criticized in these qualitative texts, but that also avoids the nihilistic relativism to which they often seem at least implicitly resigned (Wasserman, 2009) .
Finally, and most importantly, qualitative and ethnographic work perhaps has been directed to a greater extent toward the substantive issues central to the context of this paper such as culture, sense of self, and the micro-interactional problems between doctors and patients. But although its conceptual products therefore are more sensitive or kindly to individual patients, they nonetheless remain ontologically similar to the types of knowledge produced by statistical work. In quantitative work, the objectification of concepts is inherent to the operationalization practices of method itself. this often is not true of ethnography where concepts emerge as reflexive insights based on in-depth interaction with individual people and so are therefore responsive to the context from which they emerge. 4 However, when ethnographic conceptual insights emerge from one context (the actual participants in the research) but are applied to patients in the clinic, they nonetheless operate in precisely the same manner as those produced by aggregate statistical research. that is, when utilized as social facts, even rich, in-depth knowledge garnered from decidedly humanistic methods nevertheless remains distant from the actual patient. Durkheim, in fact, had a decidedly favorable opinion of ethnography precisely for its ability to produce such social facts, which we might say are conceptual aggregates, though not statistical ones (see Durkheim, 1965, 19) . Sandelowski, Voils, and Barroso note such similarities in their work on research synthesis, "the mode of analysis and results of most of the qualitative studies were similar in content, form, and interpretive depth to those presented in several of the quantitative studies" (Sandelowski, Voils, and Barroso, 2007, 237) .
In spite of this limitation, qualitative strategies still build toward the central premise here by illuminating an important difference between social science methods that work scientifically and those that work artistically. Although the latter often are transformed into scientistic concepts when brought over to the clinic, the epistemic process inherent to ethnographic methods will later help illustrate a better path to integrating social science into clinical practice.
In short, social science has offered clinical medicine a mimicked knowledge developed with either a borrowed epistemology, in the case of aggregate statistical work, or a borrowed ontology, in the case of social facts that are external to individual patients. Instead, the solution to integrating social science into clinical practice in a robust way concerns understanding the way in which it can complement the type of scientism of research, with a clearly explicated epistemic process suitable to the needs of clinical practice, such that it can teach its way of thinking, not just its thoughts. Although social science's complaints about the biomedical model hint of a scientism critique, methodological trends in the social sciences betray that this is a substantive criticism loaded with disciplinary interest, rather than one that fundamentally addresses epistemological shortcomings of medical science, particularly those related to patient care. the integrative practices of social science (e.g., ethnographic methods) are rarely schematized in an informative way and even the most humanistic social science methods ultimately offer to clinical practitioners only its extracted and objectified commodities, not its artistic dynamic processes.
there are additional practical problems with the approaches described above. Supplying only social facts to medical practitioners implicitly obliges them to consume an enormous body of knowledge to be competent in the social aspects of medicine. this is not logistically possible, given the demands they face from their own profession. Nowhere is this barrier more evident than in curriculum debates at medical schools, which with good reason have tended to feel that they simply cannot logistically incorporate social science in any robust manner. Even where social science has been incorporated into the curriculum, it remains brief and peripheral. A seminar on ethics and a workshop on bedside manner are the common requirements of social science training, with a few electives offered in cross-cultural perspectives. Finally, and most importantly, physicians are right to disregard social science's knowledge commodities. If they did not, we would be the first to accuse them of committing the reductionist fallacy, that is, of using either aggregated statistical tendencies or aggregated concepts in the form of social facts to stereotype individual people. certainly, previous social science work can be generally informative for clinical practice, just as knowing the symptoms of a disease helps a physician diagnose it. But few if any would deny that, although clinical practitioners necessarily draw on that abstract knowledge as a toolkit, diagnostic acuity in an actual patient encounter also demands in an artistic practice seeing the disease presentation in the actual patient and creating a treatment plan attentive to that particular situation. Similarly, knowing the findings of social science research can provide an important toolkit, but it is not the same as, or a substitute for, being able to see the social in a live observational moment.
In the next section, the process implicitly contained in qualitative and ethnographic ways of seeing is schematized in a way that can be usable for clinical practitioners. Integrating social science into the clinic ultimately depends on teaching practitioners just such a process of seeing the social in the immediate encounter with individual patients, rather than a didactic presentation about what social scientists removed from the clinical encounter saw among other people, at some other time and place. Although schematizing an observational logic requires naming categories such that the schema I present may at first appear to be another checklist, I will illustrate several key distinctions.
V. AN ARtIStIc ScHEMA FOR cLINIcAL PRActIcE
Identifying the differentiated tendencies of groups is quite useful for largescale public health interventions, which use social facts to build social programs. For working with individual patients in the clinic, medicine needs an explicated artistic epistemology that enables the practitioner to integrate various pieces of information into a conceptual complex reflective of individuals who may variously embody things such as culture, class, race, gender, and a variety of dispositions, but are not rightly held to be these things. that is to say that such biographical, cultural, and dispositional pieces of information, which are uniquely manifest in the individual patient, must be brought into collaboration with medical science. the physician is the one who must integrate these, but, from the standpoint of medical science, things like culture and biography are peripheral, whereas physiology, biology, and chemistry are central.
In this section, I schematize an artistic pedagogy embedded in the integrative episteme of social science, but not often explicated and therefore rarely taught in and of itself, and even more rarely taught outside of social science disciplines. I then use this schema to analyze an actual doctor-patient encounter. In so doing, I show how this artistic method of clinical practice can incorporate social science concepts in robust ways, but as a proposal for integrating social science into clinical training and practice it still is attentive to the logistical constraints of the medical profession and problematics of reductionism described above. As noted, social scientists already practice this integrative episteme when they employ methods such as ethnography and more generally when they use the "sociological imagination" to think about relationships between particular events, moments, and cases on the one hand, and universal, aggregate, structural notions on the other (Mills, [1959 (Mills, [ ] 2000 . I therefore present the schema below as simply an explication of social science thinking, that is, as a way to work from ostensible, individual markers to conclusions about abstract social concepts.
5 But as a call to teach practitioners how to think sociologically rather than what social scientists think, this solution stands distinct from other approaches seeking to integrate social facts into clinical practice.
Schematizing Social Science thinking
So far I have attempted to show that what clinical practice needs from social science is not its produced intellectual commodities, but a pedagogy for the artistic aspects of working with individual patients. Here, I explicate a social scientific way of thinking that can inform such a pedagogy. Any attempt to illustrate an epistemology must begin with the explication of kinds of concepts at play. I present here a heuristic schema that denotes four kinds of concepts. Although I am asserting neither that the world is composed of these concepts nor that this schema is the only way to make heuristic divisions of the world, it is a framework that explicates the type of thinking needed to be a clinical artist (keeping in mind that this does not oppose the scientific aspects of the clinic). this is the need of clinical practice that social science can address.
For the purposes of this paper, I claim the Multilevel Integrative cognition (MIc) schema as useful toward the development of the artistic demands of patient care and nothing more than that (Wilson and Lowndes, 2003 ; see also Wasserman, clair, and Wilson, 2009; Wilson, Wasserman, and Lowndes, 2009) . Gifted artistic thinkers likely will find such systematization off-putting and artificial. I grant them the artificial nature of this endeavor on the grounds that it is the only way to make explicit these thought processes that often are held to be a function of innate talent. It therefore seems to me to be the only way to approach teaching artistic awareness, which is typically considered to be some sort of instinct.
MIc identifies ontological categories, or kinds, constitutive of human cognition: (1) static, (2) dynamic, (3) evaluative, and (4) identity/self. these also are concentric such that the higher, more complex levels contain the lower, less complex ones (similar to a Guttman scale; see fig. 1 ). Similar and complementary heuristics can be found elsewhere, for example, in Schumacher's (1977) levels of being.
the static level (level 1) refers simply to objects that can be delineated as things unto themselves, that is, things that are this but not that. But we cannot break all observed phenomena down into elements, so the dynamic level (level 2) refers to action, a state ontologically different from the static level. Where we attempt to wrestle dynamics into the realm of statics, we are left with insufficient conceptualizations. In Zeno's Paradox of Dichotomy, for example, the impossibility of moving from point A to point B is logically validated on the premise that there are an infinite number of midpoints at which one must arrive before reaching B. this paradox results from an atomistic position that cannot fully define the nature of movement because the concept of movement does not connote a series of leaps from point to point, but a fully dynamic process. Static objects (e.g., Zeno's midpoints) cannot give full meaning to a dynamic concept. thus, we must retain the vision of dynamic concepts as ontologically different from static concepts. Moreover, the dynamic concepts contain static concepts. this is not to say that dynamic concepts deductively or objectively entail static objects, but rather that from the standpoint of human cognition, to observe movement implies some thing that is moving.
the evaluative level (level 3) encompasses moral judgments, values, and feelings. In themselves, these are ontologically distinct from levels 1 and 2, since nothing about static objects or dynamic processes inherently implies a value embedded in them or a feeling that they evoke. In other words, classic philosophical notions such as the disconnect between "ought" and "is" suggest the need for an ontological distinction between level 3 and the others (Hume, [1739 (Hume, [ ] 1978 . At level 3, the human adds something to reality. 
Integrating Social Science and Clinical Medicine
Again, my claim here is not that values and feelings are logically entailed by other kinds of concepts, but rather that from the standpoint of human cognition, meaning cannot be separated from observation. the evaluative level contains the dynamic and static levels insofar as it entails that a thing (static) produces (dynamic) a meaning or feeling (although this can be done through active movement or experienced existence).
Level 4 extends further into the human aspect of knowledge by recognizing the notion of self or identity. For human beings, a concept of self guides behaviors and interactions. For human observation, the process of giving names ascribes identity to objects. to say "rose", for example, connotes a rose-identity that is a complex of things such as a stem and petals, processes such as growing or decaying, and values such as beauty (although the content of the latter especially is culturally dependent, the ontological form would be the same in another culture where the rose may represent some judgment other than "beautiful"). As with the above, the identity/self level contains all the lower levels. For example, how one perceives oneself in a particular circumstance relates to and sometimes directly engenders different understandings (static), behaviors (dynamic), and judgments or feelings (evaluative).
the four levels of MIc provide a schema that makes explicit the type of artistic thinking common (though not always consciously) to the social sciences, where varieties of observed markers are integrated into an overarching conceptual notion of a thing, group, or person. Of course, like social scientific thinking, this schema can be employed to produce social facts of the sort already described as problematic. But as an explication of how to think in an integrative way, it also can be taught and then employed as a clinical process to avoid that problem.
Of course, inherent to naming and organizing the components of MIc is that it may initially appear itself to be a checklist. However, there are key distinctions between the typical prefabricated checklist and the schema I outline. First, the MIc schema presents an interrelated set of possible kinds, such that the four levels comprise a logic of observation, not independent categories. Second, the MIc schema does not offer substantive concepts as a typical checklist would, but rather offers a form for generating the content of the clinical encounter, one that, as noted, does not produce deductive answers, but raises critical conceptual questions. In short, the MIc schema is a content-generating heuristic. It therefore allows the clinician to generate insights relevant to the particular encounter rather than looking for affinity between the individual encounter and some preordained, abstract list of possibilities, which will always have limited connection to the individual patient.
the MIc framework explicates an integrative approach by working from static and dynamic indicators toward more complex organization at the evaluative and identity levels. Science tends to work in the opposite direction, reducing complexity by compartmentalizing static and dynamic processes. Social science's role in clinical practice ought to promote the artistic direction by illuminating the epistemic process by which doctors can understand who their patients are and what they feel and believe. that is, practitioners ought to be trained to produce their own social facts, those that emerge directly from clinical encounters with the individual patient and therefore are always directly responsive to the individual situation of that patient's care. Social scientists can illustrate a method for integrating patient presentations that transcend the physical elements and processes at levels 1 (static) and 2 (dynamic) and bring culture and personhood directly into patient care as emergent qualities of the case narrative.
For medical practitioners, increased awareness of evaluative and identity concepts engenders the capacity to generate their own social insights that evolve out of analysis of actual medical encounters rather than drawing them from aggregated social science knowledge of the statistical or conceptual variety that they may have been taught. MIc simply formalizes this notion into a practically usable ontological system. I next exemplify the utility of explicating such an artistic episteme by applying the MIc schema to discourse from an actual doctor-patient encounter.
What becomes clear is that social science insights can be generated from individual patient encounters, and thus can be always directly relevant to the individual patient, through the artistic practice of using objects and processes to become aware of what the patient believes and feels and, moreover, how they conceptualize themselves vis-à-vis others in the clinical encounter. this is an inherently important revelation about the prospects of clinical practice as a place where knowledge is generated and not just applied. Additionally, schematizing that manner of thinking illuminates better paths for teaching what is most useful about social science for the clinical practitioner (i.e., process not products).
MIc in the clinic
Data from clair's (1990) "Regressive Intervention During terminal Encounters" supplies a good way to exemplify how MIc can provide a starting point for the type of artistic integrative thinking that social science should facilitate in clinical practice. the extensive notation of his discourse analysis allows me to observe and analyze affect as well as spoken word. In this section, I present an excerpt from clair's (1990) data of an actual doctor-patient-family transcript and then use the MIc schema to organize the thematic content. What becomes clear is that MIc can help initiate an integrative process of thinking about how particular markers speak to integrated concepts like feelings, values, and sense of self. the notation indicating the structure of the discourse is as follows (from Jefferson, 1978 ; see also clair, 1990): Speaking sounds that are unintelligible :
When a word is stretched (e.g., wel:l) word Underlined for marked increase in loudness or emphasis * Softness of decreased amplitude (x) Hitch or stutter hh Alone stands for exhalation hh.
Followed by a period indicates inhalation tables 1 and 2 show excerpts from an encounter between a female physician (D), a 54-year-old terminal cancer patient (P), and his wife (F; for more description of the scenario, see clair, 1990). Prior to the beginning of the excerpt, the patient has been told that no new chemotherapy treatments are planned. that is, he has been told that he will die. the discourse is in the right-hand column while I have summarized the key thematic points, noted by clair (1990) himself, in the column on the left. table 3 represents a truncated MIc analysis of the same discourse, but with some of the key concepts organized according to the integrative logic of the MIc structure, such that deeper insights can be explicated. Various other markers could be specified to produce additional insights, but those noted here suffice for the purposes of this paper. When worked across the four levels of the MIc schema in an integrative direction (i.e., from static to identity), the various quasi-independent observations made by clair (1990) can be read as an integrated logical structure. What is illustrated here is only one of many thematic threads that run through the discourse of this encounter. Still, this shows how observations of clinical encounters can be Table 1 . Discourse excerpt and thematic summary from clair (1990) thematic content Discourse Doctor's silence manages patient's self-diagnosing assertions 017 D: Let's see your breathing tests ((looks down at patient's chart)) 018 P: (0.5) Not too good! 019 D: (5.5) Not too good so I can't(x)can't-but majorly 020 D: I was planning to use, for tha, for your cancer, the bleomycin. I can't use it 021 because of the severe obstructive path you have. Doctor's discomfort at prognosis, uses silence and chart 022 P: Yeah.
((doctor looks down at patient's chart and softly states)) 023 D: *It's a real severe obstructive path. organized with the artistic episteme of social science, generating insightful social scientific knowledge of the clinical encounter. MIc is one such schema that can initiate that process.
In the MIc analysis in table 3, the physician and patient share the key elements of the diagnosis and prognosis (static) but react differently to them, such that they become disconnected from each other's way of seeing. the patient, given the prognosis of inevitable death, begins to focus on reminiscing, avoiding much discussion about the physiological aspects of the situation (dynamic). the evaluative level compels questions about why the patient is acting this way. the implication of the patient's focusing on his biographical history and, in particular, physical activities like scuba diving that portray an image radically different from "cancer ridden, dying patient" clearly reflects that the patient feels that, given the prognosis, the "sick role" is futile (evaluative). 6 In direct contrast to his current physical condition, his assertions betray the value he places on his whole, biographical self in opposition to the limited self-concept (sick-self) to which he has been confined in the process of treatment. the explication of this identity conflict makes clear why the patient is speaking and acting the way he is, but the physician seems to remain oblivious to this and therefore ignores such biographical assertions as noncentral chatter.
clarifying the disconnect between the physician and patient requires also an understanding of the physician's way of seeing this encounter. the physician seems to operate out of a professional self-concept of herself as a curer of the body. this is a traditional notion for the professional physician, but it is an identity that manifests in this encounter in ways that disconnect the doctor from her patient. the physician displays clear discomfort (evaluative) when talking about the physiological aspects of the encounter, which are grim. But from within her curer identity, she continues to manage the discourse in order to limit it to those physiological aspects (dynamic). the prognosis combined with the physician's identity places her squarely in opposition to the patient's new sociobiographical agenda. the reader will note that the static and dynamic levels identify aspects of the encounter that are ostensible in the discourse. But what exists and transpires physically in a clinical encounter does not explain much about why such things transpire or how the various participants understand it. Artistic clinical practice begins when physicians are able to pick up on such ostensible social markers at the static and dynamic levels, but then use them to develop insights into why such things and processes transpired in the encounter. Of course, in all interactions we naturally will infer explanations, and can do so here without explicating the dialogue in the MIc schema. But by utilizing such a schematic, those not inclined to think artistically about the abstract evaluative and identity content embedded in the interaction can begin to extrapolate it.
clearly, MIc analysis still is an interpretive enterprise, but it nonetheless shows the process by which the capacity for artistic thinking can be integrated into the clinic. So, although various explanations can be offered regarding the ostensible content of this encounter (static and dynamic concepts), by utilizing the artistic epistemic direction explicated in the MIc schema, insights can become richer. For example, if making only unstructured raw observations, the patient's disengagement from the physician might be explained as a process of hopelessness in the face of diagnosis. this certainly is plausible, and is likely even part of what is going on here, but although it provides an evaluative explanation for the physical presentations at levels 1 and 2, it fails to penetrate to deeper identity issues that are contextualizing the discourse for both the patient and the physician. In this example, by recognizing that the patient is struggling to assert a whole, nonsick identity, particularly since the prognosis of inevitable death makes his sick role rather useless, we can understand the patient's frustration (evaluative) and withdrawal (dynamic) more deeply, as a disconnect with the agenda of the physician, who stays focused on physiological issues.
clair (1990) made most of these same observations without using the MIc schema or any other systematized framework for sociological thinking. As a sociologist, he simply saw the social concepts in the data. But a distinct advantage is afforded by using the MIc logic structure. clair's insights are the product of a naturally sociological mind, extensive sociological training, and a thorough knowledge of relevant sociological literature. As noted, these cannot be expected of every physician, if for no other reason than that they simply lack the time to keep up with the social science literature along with that of their own profession. Using MIc in a generative way by locating the simple observations at the lower levels and then allowing the more abstract levels to compel questions naturally and elucidate conceptual information allows for many of these same insights to be produced from the particular moment. that is, since MIc is a schematic for thinking sociologically, it can be utilized in the clinic where the abstract sociological information is logically entailed by ostensible interactional content (static and dynamic). the evaluative level inherently calls for explanation as to why the objects and processes manifest as they do, and the identity level asks why the players hold sorts of notions of self in order to engage the situation as they do. In this case, what might remain as an unexplained or poorly explained conflict between doctor and patient can be explained in terms of the disconnect between the incompatible identities out of which the doctor and patient are operating. More importantly, this signals to the physician that working with this patient will entail a shift in the physician's role, for example, from "curer" to "carer," something that would have benefited the physician in this example immensely. the importance of this example is not its substantive revelations, as these are mostly accounted for in clair (1990) without use of MIc, but rather the explication of the process of thinking through which the social meaning emerges from the immediate observable presentation. this is the skill that physicians need to develop, and MIc explicates how deeper social insights can be worked out of the things they already can see. Whereas seeing the social can be a gift or the result of extensive specialized training, it also can be extrapolated from observable, common moments, if sociological thinking is made apparent in a way that can be utilized. Although there still will be qualitative differences in the ability to see the social-the person with a gift for it may always see with more depth-this does represent a way to improve such capacities, particularly in the confines of the clinic, and therefore at least begins to answer the challenges of bringing social science into clinical practice.
Most importantly, thinking sociologically in the clinic affords more than an improved bedside manner. Rather, it speaks to the ability to connect with patients in ways that can actually improve not just their emotional treatment, but also their physical care. In the example above (see table 2), the physician seems to regard the patient's statements about scuba diving as peripheral. But the physician also wants the patient to eat more, and the patient betrays a clear lack of enthusiasm to follow those orders. But had the physician recognized the importance of engaging the biography of the patient in a meaningful way, not only would the patient likely have become less frustrated with the encounter generally, but the physician might have been more insightful about getting the patient to eat more. For example, this physician might have made gains by acknowledging the patient's nonsick identity, clearly something important to the patient, and worked it into the request. She might have phrased it thus, for example: "I need you to eat like you would if you had been out scuba diving all day." Of course, we cannot verify the extent to which this would change the encounter. certainly, its effectiveness would be dependent on more than just the utterance itself. But had the physician validated the identity assertions of the patient and incorporated a care agenda into her curing identity throughout this and other encounters, then the patient certainly would have been less likely to disengage. Of course, this is only one possibility and so ought not to be construed as a method of patient coercion. to the contrary, the very notion of working with patients in this way entails that the physician may ultimately have to alter goals and treatments to meet the patient's wishes.
VI. cONcLUSIONS the analysis above may appear unreliable even when constrained by the logic of the MIc generator. there are several reasons for this. First, the entire dialogue is not presented, though it contains information that buttresses the insights offered here (see clair, 1990) . Second, no one dialogue can indicate things like values or self-concepts in any definite, unassailable way. Rather, sure-footed insights into those sorts of abstract things require more data of the sort that a physician might "collect" across the entire course of caring for a patient, rather than from a single encounter. the capacity to develop robust longitudinal relationships with patients is especially important in the contemporary period where chronic illness management can be a decadeslong process. Although the MIc schema calls up questions that perhaps cannot be definitively answered from the data excerpt presented here, at least to the exclusion of other possibilities, it does achieve the purpose here by exemplifying the process of clinical thinking that proceeds in a more integrative social scientific way.
Moreover, schematizing in this categorical way violates the integrative nature of social science thinking. that is, the four categories make artificial divisions of an integrated social world. this is common to all disciplines, which by definition represent some sort of often useful but nonetheless artificial codified ontological foundation (see Smelser, 1997 for more discussion of other artificial ontologies in the social sciences, e.g., the macro/micro divide). Here, I explicitly present MIc as a heuristic device for developing capacities for a type of thinking that is fundamental to the social sciences. the possibilities for its actual use are varied, ranging from its specification as a natural way to encourage awareness, to the formal diagramming of clinical encounters across the four levels, similar to, though inevitably more thorough than, what I have done here. Although it is artificial to think in such a categorical way, MIc and other, similar heuristics still can serve as a starting place for recognizing the different kinds of concepts that populate social science knowledge. Utilizing it may feel stilted, particularly to the professional social scientist already adept at the complexities of this type of thinking, but for the nonprofessional it offers a usable starting place to develop the social art of clinical judgment. Many have called for the development of an artistic clinical capacity, but have not made clear exactly what this entails (e.g., Montgomery, 2006) .
Given the truly limited time physicians have to spend with patients, MIc may still seem too cumbersome for clinical practice. I would argue, for one, that it is far more practicable than the learning of a whole body of psychological and sociological knowledge, and therefore it is a significant step in the right direction. More importantly, the actual chart-making analysis could be used as a training tool in workshops and medical school curriculum so that the formal practice of it still informs awareness in the clinical encounter, even without reliance on the actual MIc chart.
In medicine, being a good clinician largely is viewed as a gift. the common wisdom is that one either has the social skills for it, or one does not. Although it is recognized that one can improve within the confines of his or her innate ability, common opinion is that if you are not "one of those types" you would be better off in the lab or behind a computer. I reject this and suggest instead that by illustrating an artistic observational methodology, the capacity for social insight and awareness can be taught, or rather procured, in any individual. Social science is fundamentally a way of seeing. the body of knowledge that it produces is a secondary outcome of that (Mills, [1959 (Mills, [ ] 2000 . Integrating such things as personhood and culture is not a gift, but a matter of awakening people to social meaning and individual identity (i.e., levels 3 and 4), which can be done by showing how these emerge from individual case narratives and where they are situated relative to concrete, easily observable
